How is ethnic identity visualized? I will explore this process through the case of the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park (Taman Budaya Tionghoa Indonesia), an ongoing museum-building project undertaken by the Chinese Indonesian social organization Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia (PSMTI). The aim of the park is to exhibit the culture and history of Chinese Indonesians within Taman Mini Beautiful Indonesia, the national cultural park on the outskirts of Jakarta.

To understand the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park, I will be using James Clifford’s concept of “the museums as ‘contact zones.’” In Routes: Travels and Transitions in the Late 20th Century, Clifford examines four museums which contain exhibitions of North American Indians of the American northwest. Clifford points out that the museums were originally sites of mass control, wherein the dominant group collected, organized, and displayed the culture of the minority. Recently however, they have become venues for minority groups’ identity formation and now function as “contact zones” between the two.1 In multi-ethnic Indonesia, the visualization of ethnicity takes various forms, from ornaments in shopping malls and statues on the streets, to distributed election campaign paraphernalia. These visualizations contain possible messages for specific purposes such as business or politics. In case of the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park, the message is conveyed from Chinese Indonesians to the nation. Viewing the Cultural Park as a opportunity for identity formation on the part of Chinese Indonesians, I will first discuss the plan for the museum, including construction plans, the planner, the location, the current state of development, and the problems. Then I will illustrate the process of how ethnicity is symbolized in the museum and how the museum may function as a contact zone for the nation and the various ethnic groups.

In this paper, terms such as Tionghoa (the Hokkien pronunciation of “Zhonghua”) is translated as “Chinese Indonesian.”2 In addition, terms referring to ethnicity, such as the Indonesian “suku,” “suku bangsa,” and “esnis,” are translated as “ethnicity.”3

The Fall

May 1998 is remembered as a moment of both liberation and fear by Chinese Indonesians. When the 32-year Suharto regime fell as the result of nationwide riots, Chinese Indonesians were eventually liberated from the various legal restrictions cast on them by Suharto. At the same time, becoming the target of violence in the riots evoked fear among Chinese Indonesians simply for being Chinese Indonesians
.
On May 12, 1998, at a protest meeting at Trisakti University in western Jakarta that featured criticism of the Suharto administration for the economic crisis that began in 1997, someone fired gunshots, resulting in the death of 4 students. This incident triggered large-scale rioting. Starting from Jakarta, the rioting spread to areas including Medan, Solo, and Palembang and resulted in the deaths of more than 1100 people.4 What started as a protest against the Suharto administration turned into an anti-Chinese Indonesian movement because of stereotypical speculations that Chinese Indonesians were economically benefitting under the Suharto administration. In the center of Jakarta’s commercial area known as Glodok, there were numerous incidences of arson and assault against Chinese Indonesian women.

Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998. Ever since, Indonesia has experienced a dizzying change in political power, from Habibie, Abdul Rahman Wahid, and Megawati up to the present Yudhoyono administration. With the change in political power, the revision of legal restrictions on Chinese Indonesians also proceeded at a rapid pace. The history of the legal changes is described in detail in Suryadinata (2003) and Lindsey (2005). These authors point to the elimination of restrictions on culture, religion and language that occurred between October 1999 and July 2001, during the administration of former president Abdul Rahman Wahid.5 Moreover, the “12th Law of 2006: New Nationality Act,” approved on August 1, 2006, is hailed as an landmark revision in Indonesian jurisprudence concerning Chinese Indonesians.6

Legal decisions to assure the socio-cultural and political equality of Chinese Indonesians have been promoted continuously, and an environment now exists in Indonesia in which Chinese Indonesians can freely express their ethnic identity. Initially, the legal revision and liberalization of expression were meant to contribute to each individual’s freedom of expression to express an ethnic identity; it is not always the case that such a right is exercised by a group. However, Chinese Indonesians have demanded recognition as one of Indonesia’s ethnic groups. Why? The anti-Chinese Indonesian movement of May 1998 was caused by negative stereotyping of Chinese Indonesians on the part of non-Chinese Indonesians. If I may oversimplify, “Chinese Indonesians” were seen as an exclusive group that controlled the state of the economy and that bore no relation to “native Indonesians.” In this stereotypical image, there was no space for individual Chinese Indonesian identity.

After the riots of May 1998 made it clear that Chinese Indonesians were seen as a monolithic group, it seems natural for Chinese Indonesians to conceive the idea of forming a positive image of a Chinese Indonesian ethnic group to counter the stereotype and avoid another tragedy. They then faced the problem of justifying and defending the existence of “Chinese Indonesian” as an ethnic group in the same vein as “native Indonesian” groups like the Javanese and the Sundanese. Realizing this situation, the formalization of religion, language, and cultural events has been pursued and Chinese Indonesian ethnicity is in the process of being visualized.

The Planner

It is not clear when the idea of the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park was conceived and by whom. However, it is now the project of the PSMTI, whose headquarters is in Jakarta. There are many Chinese Indonesian organizations in Indonesia. In Jakarta alone, there are over a hundred. Among these groups, what features does the PSMTI possess and what part does it play?

Chinese Indonesian organizations or associations can roughly be categorized as: 1) place of origin associations, such as Fujian and Yongchung; 2) surname associations, such as Rin or Yu; 3) organizations of religious affiliation, such as Confucianism or Buddhism; 4) alumni associations of Chinese language schools, before they were closed in 1967;7 and 5) social organizations. Bringing together these organizations from all over Indonesia into representative umbrella groups are the Jakarta-based PSMTI and the Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa (INTI).8

The PSMTI and the INTI were originally one organization, established after May 1998, when it was discovered that there was no nationwide social organization for the protection of Chinese Indonesians. On 28 September 1998, PSMTI was established to facilitate mutual aid among Chinese Indonesians. The founding representative of the organization was a former military personnel, Tedy Yusuf. In 1999, when PSMTI was under the leadership of Eddy Lembong, president of the pharmaceutical company Pharos INTI was established as a separate entity. According to PSMTI and INTI members, the biggest reason for the organizational break-up was leadership inexperience on the part of the Chinese Indonesians, who seemed unable to consolidate opinions. This was probably due to the fact that Chinese Indonesians were not allowed to organize during the Suharto administration.

Table 1: PSMTI membership distribution by age and sex, September 2006

Table 2: PSMTI membership distribution by region, September 2006

The Location

Taman Mini was an important part of Suharto’s cultural policy. According to Pemberton (1994), in order to deny the memory of the massacres and political purges that characterized the genesis of Suharto’s rule in the September 30 incident,9 in the early 1970s the presidential couple started to pour effort into the politicization of “culture” and the creation of “tradition” as represented in Taman Mini. Pemberton discusses the 1983 “traditional” Javanese wedding of Suharto’s second daughter Siti Hediati inside the Hall at Taman Mini and the reconstruction of the Surakarta royal palace as two bases for Suharto’s location of “tradition” in the colonial period because of its time distance from the 1960s.

Kato (1993) describes the importance of Taman Mini and the Education and Culture Ministry’s “catalogue production and documentation” project of the 27 Indonesian states as a method of packaging local culture and ethnicity under the control of the central government. Kato points out that both projects organize the diversity of multi-ethnic Indonesia not by ethnic group but by administrative unit as part of a process of national integration. As a result, Chinese Indonesians, who were not physically concentrated in any one administrative unit, were left out and became an “invisible” ethnicity. These authors see an attempt by the Suharto administration to negate unpleasant memories of the recent past and see Taman Mini as a system set up by the central government to package the “tradition” of the country’s different ethnic groups to serve as the nation’s new collective memory.
The idea for Taman Mini was announced in August 1971, as a project of the Our Hope (Harapan Kita) Foundation, headed by Tien Soeharto, the president’s wife. The particulars of the idea cannot be fully ascertained, but according to Tien Soeharto herself, Disneyland served as a model.10 One hundred hectares were secured about 5 kilometers away from the international airport, Harim Airport, in Pondok Gede for the park. In the process of obtaining the site, protest actions by students and residents were suppressed by the administration (Anderson 1973). Suharto’s strong attitude in this process suggests that Taman Mini was not planned as a recreational institute like Disneyland.

The aims and objectives of Taman Mini, published in 1975, clearly spell out its role in visualizing and expressing the Indonesian nation and its people. There are six detailed targets: 1) building and strengthening love for the motherland; 2) enriching and renewing the sense of national union and unity; 3) appreciating and enhancing the Indonesian culture inherited from the ancestors; 4) introducing the country’s cultural, natural, and other wealth to the people of Indonesia; 5) utilizing the tourism industry; and 6) helping to activate the government’s 5 year plan (Taman Mini “Indonesia Indah” 1978:46-47).

Taman Mini was organized in the following manner. At the center of the park is a man-made lake on which floats the entire Indonesian archipelago, from Papua to Sumatra. Surrounding the lake are 27 states of the Indonesian archipelago and their respective pavilions in the style of the representative “traditional” ethnic house. Inside each pavilion are displays of wedding clothes, musical instruments, and crafts. On weekends, “ethnic” dance or music is occasionally performed inside the pavilions. Beyond the provincial pavilions lie museums, mosques, churches, an orchidarium, and an aviary.

In 1975 Taman Mini opened with the 27 provincial pavilions,11 the religious institutions, the Indonesian archipelago in miniature, a Pancasila monument, and the orchidarium. The fact that no major museums were built until the 1980s may be why the pavilions emerged as the park’s nucleus (Taman Mini “Indonesia Indah” 2006b). Aside from the Indonesia Museum and the Stamp Museum, most museums built in the 1980s were devoted to science, resources, and energy. This reflected the emphasis given to development by the Suharto administration. Museums that represent ethnicity, like the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Museum, still cannot be seen in Suharto’s Taman Mini.

Aside from packaging ethnicity and unitizing administrative areas, Taman Mini as a representation of culture and tradition and Suharto’s power over the sphere of culture reinforced each other. Through the different official functions held there, of which the wedding was representative, Taman Mini was given national authority. At the same time, holding these functions in Taman Mini solidified Suharto’s place in “public” Indonesian culture by backing up his ideas of traditional culture.

Suharto’s power and the concepts of packaged ethnicity and culture were disseminated to a large audience through schools and television broadcasts, in addition to the significant number of visitors to the park itself. Figure 1 shows the number of visitors throughout Taman Mini’s 30 years, which totaled approximately 14 million. Visitor numbers rose dramatically during the 1980’s, and in 1997 alone, before Suharto’s fall, more than 7.2 million people visited. Even after 1998, more than 4 million visitors were recorded each year. Taman Mini’s influence shows no sign of weakening.

Figure 1: Number of visitors to Taman Mini, 1975-2005
Source: Drawn by author from data provided by Taman Mini Public Information Office

The significance of Taman Mini in Indonesia’s national cultural policy and its impact on the public makes it clear that its selection as the venue for the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park was meant to enhance the recognition of Chinese Indonesian ethnicity by the state and its acceptance by the Indonesian people. As Clifford points out, “the tribal or minority museum and artist, while locally based, may also aspire to wide recognition, to a certain national or global participation” (Clifford 1997:122). PSMTI believes that creating a museum within Taman Mini ensures a place for Chinese Indonesian ethnicity in the Indonesian nation.12

Photo 1. Tedy Yusuf, left; Suharto, center
(May 2005 PSMTI Bulletin)

It seems that the PSMTI’s concept of the state is represented by the Suharto regime, not the present administration, even though the plan for a Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park only came into action when the remarkable restrictions on cultural activity by Chinese Indonesians were lifted with the collapse of the Suharto administration. The plan also indicates the waning of systematic state control of ethnicities based on administrative unit. Yet, supporters of the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park offer no alternative to Suharto’s method of packaging ethnicity by wedding clothes, dances, and the authority of Taman Mini. The Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park can thus be seen as a belated assimilation into the Suharto regime’s ethnicity policy.

The Plan

The first article on the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park appeared in PSMTI’s July 4, 2001, newsletter. This article proposed that Candra Naya, the historical building of Chinese Indonesians located in the west of Jakarta, be dismantled and rebuilt inside Taman Mini. At this point, the museum was simply referred to as the “Tionghoa Museum.” The article indicates the organizational centrality of PSMTI in planning the museum as of 2001 and the historical importance of Candra Naya (discussed below). In July 2003, an appeal was made to special state governor Sutiyoso for the dismantling and reconstruction of Candra Naya inside Taman Mini. The appeal, by the owner of Grup Modern, a Chinese Indonesian enterprise, was rejected. As a result, a replica of Candra Naya will be built inside Taman Mini.13

PSMTI presented an original plan for the Chinese Indonesian Museum to the “Our Hope” Foundation in November 2002. At first, the plan was named “Museum Budaya Tionghoa Indonesia.” Though the name was later changed, the plans continued (to the present) to refer to a “museum.” On January 6, 2003, Suharto, the current president of the foundation after the death of his wife, permitted PSMTI to use two hectares inside Taman Mini for the museum.

The plan was first mentioned in Taman Mini’s annual report in the 29th issue for the year 2004. In two facing pages, the museum is introduced with the words of Ali Sadikin, governor of Jakarta during the inauguration of Taman Mini and a former military personnel during the Sukarno administration: “I fully agree with the plan to build a Chinese Indonesian Cultural Museum, as the Chinese Indonesian is part of the Indonesian nation.”14 The initial plans for the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park are then followed by a picture of a lion dance inside Taman Mini. The format used for the pavilions of the administrative units is applied here, including the combination of photos of architecture and ethnic dances.

According to Taman Mini’s Public Relations Office, the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park was originally planned by Taman Mini itself, as part of a plan to build separate museums for the different major immigrant groups to Indonesia. Museums devoted to Arabs, Indians, and Chinese, for example, are meant to be sponsored by ethnic organizations like PSMTI.15 Up to now, there is no concrete proposal for a museums about Arab or Indians; only the PSMTI and Taman Mini share this common interest. Although the extent of Taman Mini’s initiative in this regard is not clear, the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park can be seen as a significant change in Indonesia’s official interpretation of ethnicity.

Blueprints for the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park were drawn by Parahyangan University in Bandong.16 In the original plan associated with this blueprint, assemblage of the collection would start in April 2003, followed by a soft opening in April 2004, with completion expected in January 2005. However, because of changes in design and difficulty in fund raising, as of August 2006 the plan had only proceeded to the importation and installation of the gate’s guardian lions from China. In December 2005, full-scale modification designs by the Chinese private company Xiamen City Planning Group replaced the original plans, and by mid-2006, according to the Chinese-language television news “Metro News,” only 18% of the needed funds had been collected.17

A number of things might explain the difficulty in obtaining funds. The most significant would be that publicity was limited to the Chinese-language media, the PSMTI Bulletin, and Jakarta-based newspapers until the middle of 2006, when a large-scale fund-raising appeal was finally made to the general public via the national newspapers.18 Another is the opinion expressed by some supporters of a Chinese Indonesian museum that the final adopted design is too “Chinese” – that it hardly symbolizes Chinese Indonesian culture.19 But although there is opposition to the current design of the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park, there are no alternative suggestions. This shows that no discourse has been established to express Chinese Indonesian ethnicity. Despite a feeling of uneasiness about the PSMTI’s plan, there is no agreement on how to express “Chineseness” or “Chinese Indonesian-ness” which is not “Chinese.” Techniques for the expression of “Chinese Indonesian-ness” are still in the experimental stage.

The Image

What is the PSMTI’s image that is to symbolize Chinese Indonesians? Here I will examine the museum’s ideology as published by PSMTI and as indicated by the current design of the buildings.

PSMTI’s proposal consists of: 1) a letter calling for contributions; 2) the proposal sent to the “Our Hope” Foundation; 3) a summary of the purpose of Taman Mini according to Tien Soeharto; 4) the background of the project; 5) the purpose of the project; 6) the keystone of the project; 7) a map of Taman Mini; 8) the construction schedule; 9) a cost estimate of the project; 10) the museum’s organizational chart; 11) the museum committee’s name; 12) a conclusion; and 13) a donation form. Of these items, background, purpose, and keystone show the ideology of the museum.

By way of background, PSMTI explains that Indonesia was originally composed of ethnicities from different parts of the world, with differing religions and cultural backgrounds. Chinese Indonesians are an ethnic group which migrated to Indonesia 500 years ago. What is emphasized is the diversity of multi-ethnic Indonesia and Chinese Indonesians as one of the ethnicities.

The purpose of the museum will be to exhibit where from and how Chinese Indonesians originally migrated, how they lived, and how they interacted with their surroundings. A sentence without a grammatical subject follows, to the effect that the experience of fighting in the independence war, the hardships gone through in the old days, ideals, and thoughts will be also exhibited. The museum is stipulated not to be a Chinese museum or a religious institution. The intent of the museum is to unite the different ethnic groups, including the Chinese Indonesians, in order to establish social justice and prosperity.

The image outlined above clearly attempts to avoid expressions which would evoke the image of “China,” probably as a result of memories of discrimination under the Suharto administration and of the violence of 1998. However, in the construction plans, Chinese expressions have been adopted in a very clear manner. The overall image of the new Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park can be seen in photo 2. The main structures include: 1) a 7-story octagonal pagoda; 2) a replica of Candra Naya; 3) a replica of the Forbidden City; 4) a gate made from materials imported from China; 5) a Chinese junk; and 6) an imitation of the Chinatown markets found throughout Indonesia. (The original plans drawn by Parayangan University featured residential architecture instead of the replica of the Forbidden City, the design of the gate and pagoda were vastly different, and the position of the buildings was different.)

Photo 2. Map of the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park

If the Candra Naya and Chinatown replicas originate in Indonesia, other buildings symbolize “China.” The replica of the Forbidden City very obviously evokes Beijing, the political center of China. But the connection is also evident in the gate (photo 3), which seems to be modeled after the gates of the Western Qing Tomb and the Eastern Qing Tomb (photo 4). According to a PSMTI representative at the office of Indonesian Cultural Park, the gate was commissioned to reflect the five pillars of the Indonesian national policy of Pancasila.20 As we can see by comparing the photos, however, it may be rather difficult to imagine Pancasila in the absence of this explanation.

Photo 3: Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park’s gate (PSMTI-produced calendar 2006)

Photo 4: Eastern Qing Tomb gate
(http://www.epochtimes.com,accessed 10 September 2006)

Interestingly, although the origin of most Chinese Indonesians can be traced to the southern parts of China (such as Fujian and Canton) and the design was drawn by a firm in Fujian, the museum has no representation of southern China. Instead, an extremely simplified composition equates Chinese Indonesian with China and China with Beijing. Moreover, the replica of the Forbidden City, intended to be used as the exhibition hall, lies at the heart of the museum. There are three possible reasons for this. The first is political: It may be seen as an attempt to situate the political power of Beijing within the context of Chinese Indonesian history. The second is a matter of publicity: The Forbidden City may have been chosen as a representation of Chineseness because it is well-known among Indonesians in general.21 The third reason relates to the representation of ethnicity in China itself, where a representation of Fujian or Cantonese ethnicity is not necessarily perceived as Chinese ethnicity. In other words, to express Chinese identity in China, one has to adopt Chineseness as represented by Han ethnicity. The same logic would then apply to Chinese Indonesians, who must adopt Han Chineseness to express themselves as one ethnic group.
At any rate, the building which visualizes the history and culture of 500 years Chinese Indonesians, the only building that tells the story of the history of Chinese Indonesians, is not placed as the center of the museum. This building is Candra Naya.

Candra Naya

Candra Naya, located in West Jakarta’s Gaja Mada street, is one of the few extant buildings in Indonesia that show Chinese-style architecture during the Dutch colonial period. Constructed in the late 19th century, it was one of three residences built by the sons of Khouw Tian Sek, a Chinese officer. It later became the residence of Khouw Kim Au, the last executive officer of the Chinese district during the Dutch colonial period. In Candra Naya, one can see a blend of Dutch colonial Batavian architecture and southern Chinese styles.

Lohanda (1994) has described the development of the Chinese executive officer system and the role it played in colonial Indonesia. According to Lohanda, Khouw Kim Au, who was educated in the Dutch language, was twice appointed “Majoor,” the highest level a Chinese officer could attain, first from 1910 to 1918 and again from 1927 to 1942. He was also a leader of the Chinese Indonesians. After Khouw Kim An died in a Japanese concentration camp in 1945, Candra Naya was used by the Sing Ming Hui community group. The name “Candra Naya” has its roots in the Candra Naya school operated by Sing Ming Hui in the 1950s.

Candra Naya’s history spans a century of Chinese Indonesian political and social activity. In 1992, it came under the control of the Chinese Indonesian company Grup Modern, which wanted to dismantle it for rebuilding inside Taman Mini. Between 2000 and 2003, this historical structure became the object of discussion even beyond the Chinese Indonesian community. Articles published in the major national newspapers Jakarta Post and Kompas brought it to the attention of a wide range of readers, although with differing emphasis. In a series of articles, Kompas focused on the relationship between the PSMTI and the government, reporting, for example, the opposition of Jakarta governor Sutiyoso to PSMTI’s plan for Candra Naya, and the dissenting opinion of provincial government committee member Andi Tambunan.22

Picture 5: Half-finished Candra Naya replica
(photo by author, 14 March 2006)

The Jakarta Post, on the other hand, pointed out that the cultural significance of Candra Naya transcends Chinese Indonesian history.23 The newspaper reported that Candra Naya was the site of the first Indonesian Badminton Association Congress in 1957 and quoted the opinions of intellectuals such as Irma Hatsumi of Indonesia University: “the building became the headquarters for the Indonesian Student Action Front (KAMI) during the upheaval following the aborted coup in 1965, blamed by most Indonesians on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and became the site for raising money for financing the city’s development during the governorship of Ali Sadikin (1966-1977).”24 These opinions had the effect of appealing to non-Chinese Indonesian readers.

The article cited above also quotes heritage observer David Kwa on Candra Naya’s architectural style: “It has many non-Chinese touches not found in pure Chinese architecture… [including] the window shutters and window bars, marble floor, glass skylight, ironwork ornamentation, which are obviously Indisch-style architecture.” Kwa stresses that Candra Naya reflects a melting pot Batavian society.

Taking into consideration these arguments about the dismantling and reconstruction of Candra Naya, Kusno (2001) points out the significance of Candra Naya as a symbol of Chinese Indonesian society after the May 1998 riots. According to Kusno, Candra Naya is only 100 meters away from the area in Glodok most severely damaged by arson. It is a building that secures the presence of Chinese Indonesians in the area because of the Chinese characteristics of the building. In addition, because it is a reminder of the political character of Chinese Indonesians, which was once snatched away by the Suharto administration and returned to them after May 1998, Candra Naya symbolically connects the past with the future of Chinese Indonesians in Indonesian society.

Kusno’s argument makes it clear why PSMTI decided to place an replica of Candra Naya in the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park when the plan for transferring it was unsuccessful. It is the importance of Candra Naya as a symbol beyond the architectural design that PSMTI wanted in the park.

Museum Exhibitions and Activities

Lastly, I will discuss in a simple manner the contents of the exhibits at the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park and its proposed activities. The design for the buildings at the park will function as a symbol of Chinese Indonesian ethnicity. The prime purpose of the museum will be the visualization, valuation, and preservation of the culture. As stated earlier, the original plan and the present plan for the park are different, but since the primary functions of the museum remain the same, my summary will be based on the original proposal.

Three buildings will comprise the main parts of the park: the main hall for the museum’s exhibition; the replica of the Chinatown which will include restaurants and souvenir shops; and a stage for performances such as lion dances. In the main hall, the following are scheduled to be included: 1) the history of Chinese Indonesians in Indonesia; 2) artworks by Chinese Indonesian artists from different parts of Indonesia; 3) materials relating to heroes, public officials, and sports superstars during the country’s hard times; and 5) a library.

Although the details of the exhibits must wait, the major concern will be how the collective culture, history, and future of Chinese Indonesians will be adapted to the history and society of Indonesia.

Conclusion

At this stage, there is no consolidated point of view within the Chinese Indonesian community as to how its culture should be symbolized. This is because Chinese Indonesians are still in the process of searching for their ethnic identity. It can be said in fact that after overcoming 35 years of restricted expression, Chinese Indonesians have been confronted with the need to create their own ethnicity. They are now searching for its basis in China, Indonesia, the Dutch colonial period, and the years before the Suharto administration. The case of the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park implies that the creation of ethnicity is born out of an external necessity to form a coherent story with a historical basis. Thus the paradox that the plan will use the same framework as Taman Mini, the national identity project of the administration that restricted the expression and activities of Chinese Indonesians for so long.

What direction will the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park take from here? And how will Chinese Indonesian ethnic identity continue to be reshaped? These questions need further research. In addition, comparative research with other case studies may clarify whether the terms used abundantly in this paper – “Chineseness” and “Chinese Indonesian-ness” – can be defined respectably and if so, how they should be explained.

Yumi Kitamura is an assistant professor at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, and a Ph.D. candidate at Hitotsubashi University. This essay first appeared in Japanese in Gensha Vol.1 (2007) and was revised for KRSEA. It was translated by the author with assistance from Nicolle Comofay.

Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia Issue 8 (March 2007)
©Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

Notes:

1 Clifford (1997:192) borrowed the concept “contact zones” from Mary Louise Pratt’s Eyes of Empire: Travel and Transculturation (Pratt 1992:6-7).

2 The word “Cina” is considered a derogatory term among Chinese Indonesians. However, the term is the easiest word to use to denote Chinese Indonesians among the general population. There is an on-going campaign to change the term to “Tionghoa” in public documents

3 Refer to Kato (1990) for the terms.

 

 

4 The number of victims varies depending on the source. According to Republika (June 5, 1998), the Social Institute of Jakarta counted over 1000 and the National Commission of Human Rights counted 1188 victims. Suara Karya (June 10, 1998) reported 1217. In this paper, I use the number cited by Kano (2001:33).

5 In 1991, President Habibie instructed all government bodies to abolish discrimination against Chinese Indonesians. In 2000, President Wahid repealed Presidential Order No. 14 of 1967, which had prohibited the practice of Chinese culture, tradition, and religious activities and the public display of Chinese symbols. Moreover, in 2002, President Megawati, through Presidential Decision No. 19, made celebration of the Chinese New Year a national holiday starting from the year 2003.

6 The obligatory possession of a certificate of nationality by Chinese Indonesians (Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia: SBKRI) was abolished by this law.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7 By Presidential Instruction No. 37 of 1967 on Main Government Policies on the Coordination Body for Chinese Matters (Instruksi Presidium Kabinet No. 37/U/IN/6/1967 Tentang Kebijaksanaan Pokok Penyelesaian Masalah Cina).

8 Although Tan (2004: 33-39) treated these groups separately (PSMTI as a mutual aid group, INTI as a pressure group), both were considered by Chinese Indonesians to be the same kind of group.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

9 On the night of September 30-October 1, 1965, Lieutenant-colonel Untuns was involved in the abduction and murder of Chief of Staff Yani and six generals. After this incident, Suharto made a sweeping operation against communist parties in Indonesia. Through “the order of March 13” (1966), Suharto took substantial powers from Sukarno, became acting president by 1967, and eventually assumed the presidency in March 1968.

10 It is also possible that the idea came from similar miniature parks opened around the same time in Thailand and the Philippines. According to Anderson (1973), Tien Suharto visited Bangkok in March 1970, saw the miniature park Timland, and pointed out the possibility of a Presidential first ladies network acting in the background. In June 1970, a similar miniature park, Nayong Pilipino, opened. According to Pemberton (1994), Philippine First Lady Imelda Marcos was present for the opening of Taman Mini on April 20, 1975. Thus the possibility of a first ladies’ network in Southeast Asia that pushed for these cultural projects was not far-fetched.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

11 In 2002, East Timor became an independent nation. At present, only the signboard that says “museum” was replaced and the East Timor pavilion is left at the site. However, maintenance work has not been done, and when I visited the site in September 2006, it was in a state of disrepair.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

12 Statement by PSMTI publicist, 13 and 15 March 2006.

 

13 Based on a series of articles from The Jakarta Post and. Kompas. The Jakarta Post: “Candra Naya Escapes Wrecker’s Ball,” January 29, 2000, “Candra Naya: A Heritage Already Forgotten?,” April 23, 2003, “Candra Naya Relocation Rejected,” April 25, 2003, “Sutiyoso Advised to Protect Candra Naya Building,” May 13, 2003, “Candra Naya Relocation is Legal Violation,” May 24, 2003, “Candra Naya Test of Commitment to Preservation,” May 29, 2003, “Council Supports Candra Naya,” June 02, 2003, Kompas: “Dinas Museum: Candra Naya Tak Boleh Dibongkar,” Mei 12, 2003, “Soal Candra Naya, Pemprov DKI Berpegang pada Peraturan,” Mei 22, 2003, “DPRD: Gedung Candra Naya Jangan Dibongkar,” Mei 29, 2003, “Marco Kusumawijaya. Pemeliharaan Candra Naya Tak Perlu Ditawartawarkan,” Juni 19, 2003.

14 Ali Sadikin, as governor of Jakarta from 1966 until 1977, not only contributed to the building of Taman Mini but also to the urbanization of modern Jakarta.

15 Taman Mini publicist, 17 March 2006.

16 Mr. Z, a professor at Tarmanegara University who is deeply involved with the preservation efforts at Candra Naya, 18 July 2006.

17 Metro News, July 13, 2006.

18 “Proyek Taman Mini Budaya Tionghoa Kesulitan Dana,” Kompas, June 26, 2006; “Chinese in Taman Mini,” The Jakarta Post, April 19, 2007. Financial difficulties are also reported in these articles.

19 This was pointed out by a few Chinese Indonesian intellectuals I interviewed in Jakarta.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

20 August 2003, from the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park office representative in Taman Mini.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

21 For example, the Chinatown shopping arcade in Kota Wisata – the suburban Jakarta housing complex with streets named for "Rome" and "San Francisco" – contains an entrance gate named "Forbidden City" (even though the architecture does not actually represent  its style). This may suggest that "Forbidden City" is accepted as representative of Chinese architecture.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

22 Kompas, “Soal Candra Naya, Pemprov DKI Berpegang pada Peraturan,” Mei 22, 2003.

23 The Jakarta Post, “Why is Candra Naya a National Legacy?” April 23, 2003.

24 The Jakarta Post, “Candra Naya, Test of Commitment to Preservation,” May 29, 2003.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

References:

[Japanese]

青木葉子(Aoki, Yoko)．2006．「インドネシア華僑・華人研究史」『東南アジア研究』43(4)：397-418．

加藤剛 (Kato, Tsuyoshi)．1990．「「エスニシティ」の概念の展開」『東南アジアの社会』矢野暢（編），215-245ページ所収．東京：弘文堂．

---------．1993．「飼育されるエスニシティ」『地域研究のフロンティア』矢野暢（編）， 153-192ページ．所収．文堂， 182-189ページ．

加納啓良(Kano, Hiroyoshi)．2001．『インドネシア繚乱』文春新書 163．東京：文藝春秋．

土屋健治 (Tsuchiya, Kenji)．1994．『インドネシア思想の系譜』東京：勁草書房．

[English and Indonesian]

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Badan Kordinasi Masalah Cina-BAKIN. 1979. Pedoman Penyelesainan Masalah Cina di Indonesia. Vol.1. Jakarta: BAKIN.

Clifford, James. 1997. Routes: Travels and Transitions in the Late 20th Century. Cambridge MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1997.

Kusno, Abidin." Remembering/Forgetting the May Riots: Architecture, Violence, and the Making of ‘Chinese Culture’ in Post-1998 Jakarta.” Public Culture 15(1): 149-180.

Lindsey, Tim. 2005. “Reconstituting the Ethnic Chinese in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Law, Racial Discrimination, and Reform.” In Chinese Indonesians: Remembering, Distorting, Forgetting, ed. Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker, 14-40. Singapore: ISEAS.

Lohanda, Mona. 1994. The Kapitan Cina of Batavia 1836-1942. Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan.

Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia. “Apa Perbedaan PSMTI-INTI.” Buletin PSMTI 4 (Juli): 5-6.

Pemberton, John. 1994. On the Subject of “Java.” Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Pratt, Mary Louise. 1992. Eyes of Empire: Travel and Transculturation. London, New York: Routledge, 1992.

Suryadinata, Leo. 1997. Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese 1900-1995: A Sourcebook. Singapore: Singapore University Press.

------. 2004. “Indonesian State Policy towards Ethnic Chinese: From Assimilation to Multiculturalism?” In Chinese Indonesians: State Policy, Monoculture and Multiculture, ed. Leo Suryadinata, 1-16. Singapore: Times Centre.

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------. 2004. 20 April 1975–20 April 2004 Taman Mini Indonesia Indah: Pentas Damai Budaya Nusantara. Jakarta: Taman Mini “Indonesia Indah.”

Tan, Mely G. 2004. “Unity in Diversity: Ethnic Chinese and Nation Building in Indonesia.” In Ethnic Relations and Nation Building in Southeast Asia, ed. Leo Suryadinata, 20-44. Singapore: ISEAS.

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[Indonesian unpublished materials]

Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia. 2004. Proposal Pembangunan Museum Budaya Tionghoa Indonesia Taman Mini Indonesia Indah Jakarta. Jakarta: Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia.

------. 2005. Panitia Pembangunan Taman Budaya Tionghoa Indonesia Taman Mini Indonesia Indah. Laporan Relaksaan Pembangunan Taman Budaya Tionghoa
Indonesia Taman Mini Indonesia Indah.

Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa. 2006. Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 12 Tahun 2006 Tentang Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia.

Taman Mini “Indonesia Indah.” Bagian Humas. 2006. Data Jumlah Pengunjung Taman Mini “Indonesia Indah” Tahun 1975 S/D 2005.

------. 2006b. Daftar Proyek-Proyek: List of Projects Taman Mini “Indonesia Indah.”